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Book Review
Caroline E. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International 
Courts and Tribunals. Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in International 
and Comparative Law, 2011), p. 376, ISBN 978-0-521-51326-5.
In recent years there has been a rise in the number of international dis-
putes that are hard to settle because they involve scientifĳic knowledge and 
the risk of future harm. Uncertainty then plays a central role. One of the 
parties to the dispute inevitably invokes the precautionary principle to sup-
port its thesis. Judges and arbitrators cannot be expected to have a full 
grasp of the wide range of scientifĳic disciplines and techniques that dis-
putes can involve (biology, toxicology, epidemiology, geology . . .). But even 
when science says that an issue lacks conclusive proof, international courts 
or tribunals must nevertheless proceed to apply legal rules. Judges and arbi-
trators are therefore increasingly led to rely on expertise and experts. This 
uncomfortable situation presents new challenges for international courts 
and tribunals who are poorly ‘equipped’ for facing them.
Against such background, the book of Caroline Foster focuses on the use 
of expert evidence, proof and the fĳinality of adjudicatory decision-making 
in international dispute settlement under public international law. It 
addresses various “international scientifĳic disputes” (p. xiii) generally related 
to environmental and/or sanitary matters (use of watercourses, protection 
of the marine environment and marine resources, construction of hazard-
ous waste facilities, beef hormones, asbestos . . .). These conflicts arise from 
the application or interpretation of bilateral or multilateral treaties or even 
customary law. They were brought before the ICJ, ITLOS, arbitral tribunals 
operating under the UNCLOS, the WTO dispute settlement body (panels 
and Appellate body), the Permanent Court of Arbitration and other arbitral 
tribunals, including tribunals operating under the ICSID, with occasional 
references to the practice of international administrative tribunals or 
claims commissions, the European Court of Human Rights or the European 
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Court of Justice. Their common feature is to stem from the risk of future 
harm: “they look to the future” (p. xvii); they involve “prospective harm” 
(p. xix).
Caroline Foster’s book is the result of a thorough investigation that 
deserves credit for comparing the practice and procedures of a variety of 
courts and tribunals. In doing so, the author highlights an “increasing coher-
ence in the handling of procedural matters”, increasing relationships among 
the courts, and fĳinally demonstrates that “we are moving towards a time 
when they may potentially be viewed as forming part of the same court sys-
tem” (p. 3). According to Caroline Foster, a “ ‘community of international 
courts’ is gradually forming” (p. 3), and one of the signs of this evolution is 
that international courts and tribunals, beyond their diffferences, gradually 
develop a same way of handling uncertainties. From this point of view, the 
reader will appreciate the fact that the work of Caroline Foster not only fĳits 
into the evolution she analyses but also has a prospective dimension. In 
this respect, she identifĳies some trends towards more investigative proce-
dures. International courts and tribunals indeed increasingly investigate 
scientifĳic disputes themselves through on-the-spot visits, consultation with 
international organizations, appointment of independent experts . . . Finally, 
Caroline Foster shows how the evolution of the ways of producing evidence 
is symptomatic of the evolutions of international adjudication: “The trend is 
away from a general judicial deference towards sovereign states and in the 
direction of greater procedural control over cases” (p. 29).
Unless or until relevant rules and institutions are amended or supple-
mented, it is true that the role of international courts and tribunals remains 
crucial. States could and should lay down more detailed rules, but they gen-
erally do not, by lack of consensus and/or lack of political will. It is then 
judges who have to decide and address the issue “as a matter of procedural 
fairness” (p. 274).
After a remarkable introduction that clearly lays out the foundations of 
the study (Chapter 1), Chapter 2 addresses the co-operation of parties as a 
central element in the resolution of international scientifĳic disputes. On 
the basis of a detailed description of several disputes, Caroline Foster shows 
that there is an increasing recognition of the need to reinforce the parties’ 
commitment to resolving their disputes and managing their ongoing rela-
tionships through technical as well as political co-operation (p. 73).
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Chapters 3 and 4 address how international adjudicatory procedure is 
developing and underline issues related to the retention by international 
courts and tribunals of their legal decision-making authority (p. 29).
Chapter 3 considers and compares the various ways used by interna-
tional courts and tribunals to obtain expert evidence in scientifĳic cases. A 
“basic model of adjudication” consists in the traditional approach that allows 
parties to present countervailing scientifĳic evidence and appoint their own 
experts, cross-examination thus becoming very useful to test the strength 
of the parties’ arguments. However, there is a move towards a more active 
judicial handling of cases, through more investigative and adversarial evi-
dence-gathering mechanisms (appointment of experts, increasing judicial 
interactions with experts, management of expert witness-conferencing in 
international arbitration, on-the-spot visits, consultation with interna-
tional organizations, reliance on their reports, amicus curiae . . .). These 
various procedures do not rule out but complement each other and in 
practice they are often used simultaneously. Here, international courts and 
tribunals ‘learn by doing’ and if the steps they make in this direction vary, 
the “unmistakable trend is towards the use of procedures that bring greater 
judicial involvement in the scientifĳic aspects of these cases” (p. 131).
Chapter 4 investigates the role of adjudicators and the role of experts. In 
scientifĳic and technical disputes, it is true that an “expert’s advice will impact 
closely on judicial appreciation of questions arising in scientifĳic disputes, 
while continuing to require international tribunals to take full responsibility 
for their decisions” (p. xv). It is certainly not the role of experts to decide a 
case (p. 30), but things are more complicated than that. Caroline Foster 
demonstrates how these kinds of dispute challenge the rationalist point of 
view, following which there is a clear-cut distinction between facts and law. 
Experts enlighten facts; tribunals apply law to facts . . . “The law is norma-
tive, facts are physical” (p. 137). This distinction is no longer operational or 
relevant. Factual elements can be “unknowable” (p. 341). “Inevitably, it seems, 
experts will be drawn into questions of legal interpretation through their 
involvement in the application of legal terms” (p. 77). It can be the case for 
example when trying to determine how norms with variable contents 
(“à contenu variable”, Jean Salmon) or with an “open texture” (Hart), like 
rules related to “necessity” or else “reasonableness”, must be understood. 
In fact, what is reasonable, necessary or proportionate in situations of 
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 incomplete scientifĳic knowledge? It depends on the context and each case 
represents a unicum.
At the very heart of the book, Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the burden of 
proof in disputes involving scientifĳic uncertainty. They examine the poten-
tial for a reversal of the burden of proof under a precautionary approach.
Chapter 5 addresses the origins and logic of rules related to the burden of 
proof. These rules applied in international dispute settlement help ensure 
that parties have the opportunity to contradict the evidence they disagree 
with. They are “consistent with a presumption of compliance by states with 
their international legal obligations, and their development has been guided 
by principles of fairness” (p. 239). This explains the importance of transpar-
ency at all stages of the proceedings. However, when facing scientifĳic uncer-
tainty, is it not the case that international courts and tribunals have to 
accommodate fairness? That is the point of Chapter 6 that makes inroads 
into desirable directions for future developments. It explores the potential 
for a modifĳication in the articulation or application of existing rules on the 
burden of proof, in order to allow the reversal of the burden of proof 
so as to give efffect to the precautionary principle. The main question is 
then how to accommodate the precautionary principle in international 
 adjudication. 
The burden of proof is usually shouldered by the litigant in international 
adjudication. In situations of scientifĳic uncertainty, does the precautionary 
principle reverse the burden of proof ? To what extent may expert testi-
mony be used to lift the burden? Caroline Foster argues for a precautionary 
prima facie case approach, provided that scientifĳic uncertainty and the risk 
of harm in the case are above certain thresholds. Its application would 
depend on a judicial appreciation of the circumstances of a particular 
dispute. According to Caroline Foster, international courts and tribunals 
“cannot maintain a rigid approach that turns a blind eye to the substantive 
efffects of applying the rules on burden of proof where fairness requires a spe-
cifĳic modifĳication to the rules, or to the way in which they are applied” (p. 241). 
This is made possible by the inherent powers of international courts and 
tribunals that may include the “capacity to reverse the burden of proof to 
accommodate the need for precaution in order to ensure the sound adminis-
tration of justice” (p. 240).
Finally, in Chapters 7 and 8, Caroline Foster addresses the implications 
of ongoing developments in scientifĳic knowledge for the fĳinality of adjudi-
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cation, and assesses diffferent procedural options for challenging adjudica-
tory decisions in the light of subsequent scientifĳic advances. The book here 
focuses on the generic forms of review: revision, the doctrine of nullity, the 
potential for balancing through appropriately designed forms of reassess-
ment proceedings. Caroline Foster also ponders on issues arising under the 
doctrine of res judicata. According to her, “continued respect for interna-
tional judicial and arbitral decision-making depends on the availability of 
such review processes as ‘safety valves’ for disposing of difffĳiculties that will 
otherwise undermine their authority” (p. 282).
In the end, the book puts forward three recommendations. First, inter-
national courts and tribunals should welcome the precautionary approach 
or principle – Caroline Foster is right to consider that this is a semantic 
distinction – whether through expert scientifĳic evidence from the parties 
and their appointed experts, or through experts directly appointed and 
consulted by international courts and tribunals. Second, international 
courts and tribunals should accommodate rules on the burden of proof in 
order to apply the precautionary principle in exceptional cases by exercis-
ing their inherent powers, this taking the form of a precautionary prima 
facie case approach. Third, international courts and tribunals’ decisions 
should provide for the reassessment of cases when subsequent scientifĳic 
developments may afffect the basis of their decision.
On these complex and topical issues, Caroline Foster provides a very 
informative and enriching book. She devotes herself to a thorough analysis 
of numerous cases – an analysis that is as impressive as it is useful –, includ-
ing written and oral proceeding materials. But the book is also forward-
looking and informs an ongoing debate.
Indeed, the issue of the efffect of the precautionary principle on evidence 
and proof has in practice arisen before international courts and tribunals. 
Some judges or arbitrators individually expressed the opinion that the prin-
ciple should result in a reversal of the burden of proof. To date, however, no 
international court or tribunal has inferred from the precautionary princi-
ple such a consequence for the rules of evidence. The European Court of 
Justice, who sees in the precautionary principle a general principle of Euro-
pean Union law, does not admit it either, nor does the European Court of 
Human Rights, even though it has deduced positive obligations for States 
from the precautionary approach. Is an evolution still possible or even 
desirable? From a rational point of view, the precautionary principle should 
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not automatically lead to a reversal of the burden of proof. Proof of the 
absence of risk is, in cases of scientifĳic uncertainty, more difffĳicult to report 
than its existence and could become probatio diabolica, blocking technologi-
cal progress and fĳinally crystallizing into objections to the implementation of 
a precautionary approach. Such a result would raise legitimate concerns 
about a principle which is already controversial. It might even turn against 
the objective of sustainable development that implies, on the contrary, a rec-
onciliation between a precautionary approach and economic development. 
However, if the precautionary principle cannot lead to a systematic reversal 
of the burden of proof, could it or should it justify a better allocation of the 
burden between the parties to an international proceeding?
In our ‘risk societies’ (Ulrich Beck), the precautionary principle is neces-
sarily going to play an increasing role. One has to remember that in the 
Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring 
persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (1st February 2011, 
thus issued after the writing of Caroline Foster’s book), the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber of the ITLOS saw in the precautionary approach a rule of custom-
ary international law, belonging to due diligence obligations. This irresist-
ible evolution is bound to impact on procedural rules and international 
adjudication. The credit of Caroline Foster’s book is to inform the debate, 
providing keys to understanding and anticipating evolutions. On the other 
hand, from a practical point of view, the need to change procedural law 
toward a reversal of the burden of proof is perhaps less present now because 
of the development of positive obligations for states to implement the pre-
cautionary principle. If one follows the Opinion of the ITLOS Chamber, a 
precautionary approach is part of the states’ positive obligation of due dili-
gence and consequently consists in obligations “to do” something. Accord-
ingly, proof is lightened, not the burden itself but what has to be proved: 
the complainant does not have to prove the existence of a risk, but that the 
state has not set up a complete legislative and regulatory framework that 
would have allowed measuring the probability and dangerousness of harm, 
and eventually to take measures to prevent it. Proof of such failure does not 
present any particular difffĳiculty.
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